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Abstract
This article aims to analyze the extent to which good governance principles applicable to Nordic 
companies may be an appropriate good governance tool for a public or organizational entity.
The company is an advanced organizational invention for its purpose, and Nordic companies are 
generally regarded as highly productive and well run. Nordic companies approached as small-
scale units of governance are therefore analyzed in this article as examples of the implementation 
of good governance principles and practices. In Nordic corporate law, a set of self-regulatory 
norms are a prominent part of what constitutes good corporate governance. The principles 
underlying these self-regulatory norms are scrutinized in this article, and the Norwegian Code 
of Practice for Corporate Governance is at the heart of the analysis. The norms are generally 
detailed and operationalized, and as such they may serve as examples of how concerns, such as 
accountability, transparency, predictability, conflicting interests and loyalty, clarity and equality, 
are put into practice. The norms also advocate value and standard setting. Although there are 
significant differences between the corporate sphere and the public or organizational sphere, the 
similarities are in many ways greater, and corporate norms may serve as good governance tools 
when scaled up to other issue domains or levels as done in this article.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
A company may be viewed as a small-scale unit of governance.1 It is a delimited con-
struction, thoroughly regulated, and accountable for its own business. A variety of 
*Correspondence to: Lena Schøning, Research Fellow, K.G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, 
Faculty of Law, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, N-9037 Tromsø, Norway. Email: lena.schoning@
uit.no
2017 L. Schøning. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons  
Attribution- NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), allowing third 
parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the 
 material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license.
Citation: L. Schøning. ‘‘Good Governance Tools: Cross-Pollination from Nordic Corporate Law.’’ Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 
Vol. 8, 2017, pp. 160–173. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v8.722
Good Governance Tools: Cross-Pollination from Nordic Corporate Law
161
activities and operations may be carried out by the company, and its ultimate objective 
is maximizing profits.2 There are fundamental resemblances in the regulation of com-
panies in the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 
and Nordic companies in general are regarded as highly productive and well run.3 
The principles behind the Nordic governance model may as such be of particular 
interest in the search for good governance tools.
Each of the Nordic corporate governance codes is directly applicable to the stock 
exchange listed companies of the respective Nordic country.4 This article investigates 
the principles underlying Nordic corporate governance codes that are of a more gen-
eral nature and thus does not give an exhaustive account of the principles enshrined 
therein.5 The underlying principles highlighted in this article include accountability, 
transparency, predictability, clarity and equality. The Nordic corporate governance 
codes provide examples of how these principles are operationalized in a corporate 
setting. By accentuating and to some extent generalizing these principles, the study 
shows the extent to which these principles may be appropriate in other governance 
settings, such as in the public or organizational sphere.
1.2 Approaches to Governance
Fleckner and Hopt distinguish between external corporate governance and internal 
corporate governance.6 External corporate governance refers to the larger societal con-
text of which the company is a part and concerns the relationship between the company 
and externalities, such as the state and creditors. In contrast, internal corporate gover-
nance is concerned with the company’s internal affairs, focusing on the relationships 
between owners and the top decision making organs.7 Although this article focuses on 
internal corporate governance, distinguishing between internal and external corporate 
governance is not always easy, as internal corporate governance to some extent also 
considers the interest of stakeholders outside of the company. Internal corporate gov-
ernance is often referred to simply as corporate governance, as is the case in this article.
Governance may in turn be approached by looking to the governance system or the gov-
erning process. A governance system is comprised, in the words of Young, of arrangements 
that social groups develop either spontaneously or through deliberate actions to perform 
the function of governance in a variety of settings.8 In contrast, the governing process is the 
interaction within this system over time. The Nordic corporate governance codes include 
principles on both the governance system and the process of governing, without address-
ing this division specifically. This article will address both in a similar manner.
The general notion of good governance includes such concerns as accountability, 
openness, participation, effectiveness, equity and coherence.9 The underlying princi-
ples of the Nordic corporate governance codes include elements of these concerns, 
perhaps in a different wrapping as investigated below.
1.3 Corporate Governance
Good governance in the corporate sphere is often referred to as corporate governance. 
There are several definitions of corporate governance. One commonly referred to 
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definition is “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”.10 Hence, 
direction and control are essential, as highlighted by Fleckner and Hopt.11 How-
ever, the system may also be accentuated in this context by adding a process, as the 
principles of corporate governance presented in this article comprise both. Another 
corporate governance definition is:
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s manage-
ment, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.12
This definition also highlights the objectives of the company, how to reach these 
objectives and monitoring achievements underway. As the discussion below shows, 
principles of corporate governance may also include defining corporate values and 
setting ethical standards, which are highlighted in this article as essential. Thus, an-
other element may be included in the definition, which is standard setting. Combin-
ing these definitions and elements, corporate governance may be expressed as the 
system and process of direction and control to reach the objective of the company 
while meeting a set standard.
Essential for corporate governance is balance of power.13 At the top of the hierarchy 
of the Nordic company is the owner or shareholder, followed by the board and the 
management. According to the agency-theory, there is an inherent conflict of interest 
between and within these organs, which is addressed and mitigated by corporate gov-
ernance principles.14 The agency-theory presupposes that conflicting interests exist be-
tween the agent and its principal, traditionally referred to as a principle-agent conflict 
and often described referring to Adam Smith’s statements on managers watching more 
vigilantly over their own money than over other people’s money.15 The principle-agent 
conflict implies that an agent, such as a governing organ or a controlling shareholder, 
is taking care of somebody else’s values, i.e. the interest of the company or of all of the 
shareholders.16 The conflict of interest hence refers to the potential motivation of the 
company’s governing organs, the loyalty of which should always rest with the company, 
as opposed, for instance, to the shareholder who appoints them or their own interest.
An example of a potential principle-agent conflict exists between the shareholders and 
the manager, where the manager may be motivated by the short-term interest of the com-
pany that he or she manages if, for instance, the short-term interest of the company is a 
premise for the manager’s remuneration or perceived reputation. A second order of con-
flict exists among the shareholders, where there are minority shareholders and a control-
ling shareholder who holds the majority of the shares and accordingly the voting rights. 
Voting power could in principle mean that a majority shareholder could decide anything 
based on its interests at the expense of minority shareholders. These are examples of prin-
cipal-agent conflicts that are addressed and mitigated by corporate governance principles.
The corporate governance norms addressed in this article regard both the composi-
tion of the governance system and the process or operation of governance. The norms 
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are relatively detailed. They are applied by a number of companies, which annually re-
porting on their compliance, as a result of which they are broadly operationalized. Gen-
eralizing from governance in a small-scale corporate micro setting scaled up to a larger 
level or to another issue domain must be done with caution. However, in Young’s words, 
“it does not make sense to give up on the search for generalizable propositions just 
because some significant differences among issue domains are apparent”.17 Moreover, 
keeping in mind the difficulty of transplanting models from one system to another re-
mains. This article focuses on the underlying principles and tools in the corporate gover-
nance principles. Either individually or in combination, they are a relevant supplement 
outside the corporate sphere, as, in the words of Poto, “it is evident that the similarities 
of a private entity and a public structure, in many ways, are greater than the differences 
between them”.18
In the following sections, the sources of the Nordic corporate governance prin-
ciples will first be observed in section 2, followed by an account of the compliance 
mechanism in section 3. Thereafter, the recommendations of the Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate Governance19 will be dealt with as categorized by the underly-
ing principles in the subsections to section 4: 1) Accountability; 2) Corporate Values 
and Standard Setting; 3) Good Management Practices; 4) Equality of Shareholders 
and Minority Protection; 5) Conflicting Interests and Loyalty; and 6) Openness and 
Transparency. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in section 5 to summarize 
the findings and the general appropriateness of the underlying principles.
2. Sources of Nordic Corporate Governance Principles
A question can be raised as to why this article makes general assumptions about Nor-
dic corporate governance, given that every Nordic company is established under the 
statutory laws of its respective Nordic country. The Nordic countries, however, have 
the same legal traditions, and Nordic company law has developed since the earliest 
companies acts of the late 1800s.20 Additionally, cooperation between scholars across 
the Nordic region continues today, resulting, for instance, in publications on Nordic 
corporate governance.21 In addition, the corporate governance bodies of the Nordic 
countries cooperate and address corporate governance as Nordic.22
The written and unwritten rules, norms and practices that constitute the regula-
tory framework for every corporate governance system stems from three different 
norm systems.23 The first category is the norms provided by statutory regulation, 
including the companies acts and related rules and regulation. In addition to defining 
what constitutes a company, the companies acts set out the hierarchical decision-
making organs of the companies and their powers.
Another category of norms, at the other end of the scale, is informal norms. In a 
corporate governance setting, examples of such norms may be striving for consensus 
in the board’s decision-making and norms of a more procedural kind, such as when 
and how to address a matter in a board meeting.24 The analysis of such norms does 
not fall within the scope of this study.
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A third category of norms is comprised of self-regulatory norms, and it is in this 
category that the Nordic codes of corporate governance belong. Hence, this article will 
primarily investigate this category of norms.25 The self-regulatory norms are of partic-
ular interest, as they are defined by the business sector itself26 with little or no interfer-
ence by the government,27 and hence they express what internally is regarded as good 
governance. Nevertheless, the self-regulatory norms provided by the codes do place 
themselves in their normative context and refer to statutory norms where relevant.
The Nordic corporate governance codes stem from the corporate governance code 
movement that swept from the UK to the rest of the world.28 Encouraged by the EU 
Commission, each Nordic country developed and adopted its own code of practice 
for corporate governance early in the first decade of the 2000s.29 King and Toffel 
explain that self-regulatory norms are implemented due to institutionalization and 
strategic interest.30 It may be added that the codes probably reflect uncontroversial 
values and meet identified needs.31 Otherwise, the broad acceptance and implemen-
tation of the norms across the Nordic countries for a number of different companies 
may not have been facilitated.
3. Comply-or-explain Principle
The Nordic codes of corporate governance are all based on the comply-or-explain prin-
ciple. This means that the companies must do a self-evaluation of whether they comply 
with the principles included in the codes or, if not, justify the deviation and the solution 
opted for instead.32 The idea behind the comply-or-explain principle in the codes ac-
knowledges both that the principles may not be suitable in all instances and that there 
may be fair reason to deviate from them. Furthermore, the codes are meant to be ambi-
tious on-going tools for improvement, implying that meeting the requirements must also 
be challenging and that deviations because of this are expected.33 On the contrary, the 
broad and available option to deviate from the recommendations included in the code 
may as well be termed, in the words of Hansen, as “comply or excuse”.34
The comply-or-explain-principle implies that in general the norms of the codes are 
recommendations, not injunctions. The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate 
Governance in general literally sets out what the company “should” do.35 A relevant 
exception is the first section, which provides that a company “must” implement good 
corporate governance and “must” provide an account of corporate governance by 
the board of directors in a report accompanying the annual accounts, as this is also a 
statutory requirement and listing requirement of the stock exchange.36
The comply-or-explain principle and the reporting requirement result in an annual 
self-evaluation by a company adhering to the code. At the very least, this provides an 
opportunity for regular development of the governance of the company in relation to 
the principles provided therein.
In the following paragraph, the content and the underlying considerations behind 
the principles are addressed. The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Gover-
nance is at the core of the analysis.
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4. Good Governance Tools and Principles
4.1 Accountability
The first section of the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
makes the board of directors accountable for ensuring that the company implements 
good corporate governance.37 This implies two perhaps simple, yet important as-
pects. First, ensuring that governance is “good” is identified as a task to be put on the 
agenda and dealt with annually. Second, the section appoints one particular organ, 
the board of directors, to be accountable for carrying out this task to ensure that 
governance is good.
As explained in the introduction, governance in general encompasses a system 
and processes relating to complex interaction among diverse actors. In light of this 
complexity, the codes ensure that good governance is established as a task and that 
accountable organs or persons are appointed responsible. In every governing unit, a 
top-level managing organ may be identified as accountable for good governance and 
for bringing this issue to the table periodically.
4.2 Corporate Values and Standard Setting
The first section of the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance fur-
ther recommends that the board of directors define basic corporate values and for-
mulate ethical and corporate social responsibility guidelines.38 Provided that they 
are implemented, guidelines for corporate values and ethical and corporate social 
responsibility may provide an important basis for the way the company carries out its 
activities towards people, society and the environment.39
The values and guidelines will typically convey which values cannot be put at risk 
in pursuing the economic objectives of the company. For instance, ethical guidelines 
normally include policies on anti-corruption, honesty and respect towards fellow em-
ployees and customers, whistle-blowing40 and impartiality. Corporate social respon-
sibility guidelines generally refer to topics such as human rights, employee rights, the 
environment, fair operating practices, consumer issues, and community involvement 
and development.41
The section of the code regarding corporate values and standard setting illustrates 
how a company can ensure that its activities meet a certain standard and that the 
objectives of the company do not justify means to achieving said objective unless the 
means comply with established standards. This may be relevant for other governing 
units that serve economic purposes, such as companies do, or serve other purposes. 
Achieving ideal goals while at the same time focusing on the standards to which 
activities must meet may, for instance, ensure that woolen blankets purchased for 
refugees are not woven using child labor, or that biofuel is not produced in violation 
of the land rights of indigenous people.
These examples show that corporate values and standard setting are essential for a 
responsible company, an issue the author finds important to highlight.
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4.3 Good Management Practices
Some of the recommendations in the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate 
Governance contain what perhaps may best be described as good management prac-
tices, perhaps even basic management practices. These include recommendations to 
describe in writing the activities that the company carries out, its strategy and goals, 
having an annual plan, and reporting on the expected outcome.42 These recommen-
dations may in turn ensure predictability for the shareholders and clarification for the 
involved organs, issues which should not be underestimated. Predictability enables 
steering expectations to be met and consequently satisfaction to be reached. Clarifi-
cation for all of the involved organs on where the company is headed and milestones 
reached will in turn result in their moving in the same direction.
Furthermore, the code recommends that the board of directors ensure that the 
company has sound internal control and systems for risk management.43 Internal 
control arrangements will facilitate the supervisory responsibilities of the board of di-
rectors and support the quality of the company’s reporting. Managing risks includes 
being informed of existing and potential risks posed by the company’s activities. Risk 
management and internal control can be categorized under the basic tools for good 
management.
The recommendations of the Norwegian Code of Corporate Governance con-
cerning good management practices illustrate what may be regarded as common 
sense tools in management practices: writing down, planning, and gaining and dis-
seminating information about where the company is headed. These tools result in 
predictability and clarification, and hence better management. The range and scope 
of such measures is broad.
4.4 Equality of Shareholders and Minority Protection
Equality of shareholders is an important principle in corporate governance and aims 
to mitigate the potential conflict of interest typically found between a controlling 
shareholder and a minority shareholder. The controlling shareholder, holding the 
majority of shares, has greater power through its voting rights, relative to its number 
of shares, compared to a minority shareholder. The Norwegian Code of Practice for 
Corporate Governance has several recommendations aimed to balance these inter-
ests that supplement the statutory regulation in this regard. Some of these recom-
mendations probably have little relevance outside of the corporate sphere given the 
subtleties of shares, including the possibility that companies can merge or be taken 
over.
Other recommendations in the code concerning shareholder equality are of a more 
general nature. These recommendations include regulations on the equal distribution 
of information, procedures for interactions between shareholders and the company, 
and procedures for carrying out meetings of the shareholders, such as the regula-
tion of giving notice and voting.44 The equal distribution of information and proce-
dures for interaction may facilitate real decision-making in meetings, as opposed to 
Good Governance Tools: Cross-Pollination from Nordic Corporate Law
167
informal decision-making in the corridors, and may protect the company from being 
inappropriately influenced by a strong shareholder.
Furthermore, the code recommends that a nomination committee be appointed, 
the composition of which should consider the interests of all of the shareholders. The 
nomination committee should also propose candidates to the board of directors, tak-
ing into account, among other qualifications, the interests of all of the shareholders.
The shareholders are the ultimate owners of the company, and in this regard they 
may be compared to parties to a treaty establishing a forum, or similarly members 
of an organization, conference of parties or the like. The recommendations in the 
Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance concerning equality of infor-
mation, procedures for meetings and nomination committees may provide examples 
of how equality among such actors may be pursued.
4.5 Conflicting Interests and Loyalty
The agent-principal theory described in section 1.3 above implies that, in principle, 
the interests of somebody working for the company may not always rest with the 
company as a starting point, but should be put first.45 In an extreme example, not 
putting the interest of the company at the front when carrying out duties for the 
company may be regarded as corruption or the like. Extreme examples are dealt with 
in the criminal codes and are not addressed in the corporate governance codes. Not 
putting company interests at the forefront may also be in breach of statutory or com-
pany regulation of impartiality.46 In addition, the Norwegian Code of Corporate Gov-
ernance intends to mitigate some aspects of conflicts of interest. The code addresses 
some manifestations of where the interest or the duty of loyalty should be, which may 
affect the performance of the company and, as such, is significant for the company, 
even though these manifestations may not constitute a breach of other regulations.
One group of recommendations in the Norwegian Code of Corporate Governance 
in this regard concerns the remuneration of boards of directors and management.47 
These recommendations set out inter alia that the remuneration of boards of direc-
tors should not be linked to the performance of the company and restricts linking the 
management’s remuneration to the short-term performance of the company. Linking 
the remuneration of a director or board member to performance or to the short-term 
interest of the company may be neither illegal nor unethical, but it may contradict 
the long-term interest of the company and as such may not constitute an example of 
good governance.
Furthermore, the code has some recommendations relating to how economic 
transactions with close associates should be handled.48 The economic transactions at 
hand include, for instance, any major purchase or acquisition of goods and services. 
When the other party to the transaction, such as a host organization, host country or 
consultant, also has a role in the company at hand, special care should be taken to 
ensure that the transaction is not influenced by the relationship, but is entered into 
as if it were entered into with an independent third party.
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The Norwegian Code of Corporate Governance also addresses conflict of in-
terest issues in the composition and operation of the decision-making organs. The 
code recommends that the composition of the board of directors meet the compa-
ny’s need for expertise and independence.49 This also encapsulates a broader con-
cept that the loyalty of the board of directors shall be with the company and not, 
for instance, with a shareholder for whom the board member in question is working 
or by whom the board member was appointed.50 Regardless of these principles, the 
code further recommends that two members of the board of directors be indepen-
dent of any main shareholder, thus implying that the loyalty obligation upon the 
individual is not enough and that more is needed to strengthen the independence 
of the board.51 The code also includes recommendations that the board of direc-
tors should be independent of its inferior executive management in addition to its 
superior shareholders.52
In a broader governance context, the underlying principle of loyalty and conflict 
of interest may have a wide scope of application. When it comes to good governance, 
applied to both the private and the public sector: “It is always about actors’ relations 
and about preventing the conflicting interests of the parties from becoming obstacles 
to the pursuit of the entity’s common interest”.53 If a person from a sectoral director-
ate, such as a petroleum directorate, is appointed as a board member to a cross-sec-
toral institution, if a member of an indigenous organization is appointed as a board 
member to a water management body, or if a developing country is appointed to the 
board of the World Bank, which interest would she or he pursue? Where does her or 
his loyalty lie? There is probably no simple answer to these questions, but clarification 
and awareness of conflicting interests, loyalty and loyalty drivers are likely to serve as 
tools to improve governance.
4.6 Openness and Transparency
Openness and transparency are essential for good corporate governance according to 
all the Nordic codes. This is reflected inter alia in the reporting recommendations not 
only related to financial statements and remuneration, but also related to corporate 
governance as such.54 The reporting recommendations on corporate governance are 
further described in section 3 above.
The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance addresses some mani-
festations of the principle of openness or transparency, whereas others are provided for 
by statutory law and informal norms.55 The code recommends that companies estab-
lish guidelines on reporting financial and other information based on openness.56 The 
recommendation hence accentuates the value of openness when deciding when and 
how to disseminate company information. Furthermore, the code recommends simul-
taneously distributing and publishing information on a company web page.57 Addi-
tionally, this recommendation ensures open disclosure of vital company information.
These recommendations exemplify some practical solutions related to openness, 
which can be adopted in other governance settings.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The principles underlying the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Gover-
nance addressed in this article are general in nature and may as such be appropriate 
in other governance settings. The examples of how these broad principles are put into 
practice may serve as good governance tools summarized as follows.
The principle of accountability is generally recognized as a good governance prin-
ciple.58 In the Nordic corporate sphere, the principle is applied operationally inter alia 
by identifying corporate governance as a task to be put on the agenda periodically. 
Furthermore, the organ accountable for this task is identified. This illustrates how 
accountability can be put into practice.
Another prominent principle of governance underlying the code is equality. For 
instance, the code provides for how equality among owners of different influence 
may be facilitated by equal distribution of information and procedural regulation of 
the interaction of owners and the company, thereby facilitating concurrency between 
real and formal decision-making. Additionally, it shows how equality among owners 
or parties may be put to practice in appointing steering organs by appointing nomi-
nation committees with a mandate to consider the interests of all of the shareholders. 
The study hence provides examples on how the general principles of equality may be 
operationalized.
Defining (corporate) values and setting a standard for activities, including those 
of an ethical or environmental nature, is a fundamental principle for any responsible 
entity. In this manner, the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
illustrates how values and standard setting may be put to practice.
The recommendations described in this study as good management practices may 
also be a different variant of a good governance tool. The practices of planning, struc-
ture, documentation and the like provide for predictability and clarity, which can 
enhance governance in a wider sense.
Clarification of conflicting interests, including defining where loyalty should rest, 
is another underlying principle of the code. Awareness of loyalty and loyalty drivers 
result in a clarification of roles and responsibilities and serves to mitigate the princi-
pal-agent conflict of interest and the likelihood of misplaced loyalty. This variant of 
good governance is of a general nature and may as such also be appropriate in other 
governance settings.
Openness and transparency in a Nordic corporate setting means that companies 
regularly report publicly not only on their financial accounts and remuneration, but 
also on corporate governance as such. Regular reporting on good governance pro-
vides for self-evaluation of good governance, which may be an appropriate means for 
focusing on and improving governance in any governance setting.
A further question may be raised regarding typical good governance principles 
the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance does not contain. A par-
ticipatory process is not included in the principles59 perhaps because of the rela-
tively broad employee representation provided by statutory law. Furthermore, since 
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a company is a hierarchical system, its nature is more dictatorial than democratic in 
its decision-making system. The code does not provide for consensus-based decision 
making either. This may be explained by the hierarchical nature of a company, or 
because effectiveness implies otherwise.60
The underlying principles of Nordic corporate governance covered by this study 
provide governance tools and principles that can be used in both the private and 
public spheres. These generally applicable good governance principles, and examples 
of how they are put into practice, may, building on the metaphor of Lau Hansen, 
enable a cross pollination across the corporate sphere to other governance systems.61
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 21. Such as the cooperation behind The Nordic Corporate Governance Model, Lekvall and Lau 
Hansen.
 22. Danish Corporate Governance Committee et al., “Corporate Governance in the Nordic 
Countries”, (Internet2009).
 23. Lekvall and Lau Hansen.
 24. As observed by the author in board meetings, however, the application area of these norms, 
whether wide or narrow, is unknown.
 25. The Danish code is published here: https://corporategovernance.dk/recommendations-cor-
porate-governance; the Finnish code is published here: http://cgfinland.fi/en/recommenda-
tions/the-finnish-corporate-governance-code/; the Islandic code is published here: http://
chamber.is/services/corporate-governance; the Norwegian code is published here: http://
www.nues.no/en/frontpage/slideshow/The+Norwegian+Code+of+Practice+for+Corpo-
rate+Governance.9UFRnY0D.ips; and the Swedish code is published here: http://www.cor-
porategovernanceboard.se/the-code. All sites accessed on 23 March 2017.
 26. The development of self-generating systems along with other norm systems is not peculiar 
to the corporate world; it has occurred in other governance systems, see Young.
 27. Jesper Lau Hansen, “Catching up with the Crowd -- but Going Where? The New Codes 
on Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries.,” International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance 3, no. 3 (2006).
 28. Fleckner and Hopt.
 29. The Danish code came first.
 30. Andrew A King and Michael W Toffel, “Self-Regulatory Institutions for Solving Envi-
ronmental Problems: Perspectives and Contributions from the Management Literature,” 
(2007).
 31. Hansen.
 32. See for instance as set out in Section 1 of the Norwegian code.
 33. Lekvall and Lau Hansen.
 34. Hansen.
 35. Where the Norwegian code sets out what is already required by statutory law, the term 
“must” is used. However, the statutory requirements are not a focus in this article.
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 36. See for instance the Norwegian Accounting Act section 3-3b included in 2010 and the con-
tinuing obligations of stock exchange listed companies issued by the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
section 7. The statutory and stock exchange requirements were included after the self-regu-
latory norms were first manifested.
 37. Not as explicitly formulated in the Swedish, Danish, Finnish or Icelandic codes, however ob-
ligations, in these codes and relevant statutory regulations, to organize the company duly and 
to report and inform on good governance provides for similar solutions. See supra note 24.
 38. Similarly, the Danish code section 2.2 recommends policies on corporate social responsibil-
ity, the Swedish code provides for guidelines for the company’s conduct in society in section 
3 and a sustainability report in section 10, the Finnish code states in section II that the board 
of directors ensures the establishment of corporate values only, and the Icelandic code pro-
vides for policy on social responsibility and ethical guidelines
 39. Comments to section 1 of the Norwegian code.
 40. Whistle-blowing in this regard refers to revealing wrongdoing to somebody outside of the 
hierarchical line within the organization or to the public.
 41. The international standard for corporate social responsibility (CSR), ISO 26000, covers 
these topics. Some scholars argue that corporate social responsibility and corporate gover-
nance should be merged, see Beate Sjåfjell, “Responsible Corporate Governance,” European 
Company Law 7, no. 1 (2010).
 42. Section 2 of the Norwegian code includes a recommendation that the company’s business 
should be clearly defined, that the company should have clear objectives and strategy for 
its business, and that all of these elements should be reported on annually. Section 3 of the 
code includes a recommendation that the company should establish a clear and predictable 
dividend policy. Section 9 of the code has a recommendation that the board of directors 
should produce an annual plan for its work with particular emphasis on objectives, strategy 
and implementation. Section 9 further sets out that the board of directors should issue 
instructions for its own work and for executive management. Similar although less detailed 
recommendations are found in the Danish code sections 1 and 2, the Swedish code section 
3, the Finnish code recommendation 11 and the Icelandic code section 2.4
 43. Section 10 of the Norwegian code. Risk management and internal control are two related, 
yet diverse concepts. Internal control often relates to financial reporting and as such secures 
the quality of the reporting, whereas risk management in addition to the risk in financial re-
porting may also embrace operational risks, market risk etc., which provides decision-makers 
with information.
 44. Sections 4 and 6 of the Norwegian code. The principle of equal treatment is common to the 
Nordic countries, however the extent to which procedural regulations are covered by the 
codes vary. See section 1 of the Danish code, guiding principles and section 1 of the Swedish 
code, the introduction to and recommendation 1 to the Finnish code and section 2.10 of the 
Icelandic code.
 45. That being said, it is not always easy to establish what the company interest is. See for instance 
Bråthen. page 61 and Irja Vormedal, “Corporate Strategies in Environmental Governance: 
Marine Harvest and Regulatory Change for Sustainable Aquaculture,” Environmental Policy 
and Governance 27, no. 1 (2017).
 46. Impartiality may for instance be regulated in the ethical guidelines of a company or other 
company policy or in employment contracts.
 47. Sections 11 and 12 of the Norwegian code. Correspondingly in section 4 of the Danish code, 
section 9 of the Swedish code, section V of the Finnish code and section 2.7.7 of the Icelan-
dic code.
 48. Section 4 of the Norwegian code and in like manner in recommendation 28 of the Finnish 
code. This topic is further subject to statutory regulation.
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 49. Section 8 of the Norwegian code. Similar in section 3 of the Danish code, 4 and 5 of the 
Swedish code, recommendations 8-10 of the Finnish code and section 2.2 and 2.3 of the 
Icelandic code.
 50. Ibid.
 51. Ibid.
 52. Ibid.
 53. See Lara Fornabaio and Margherita Poto, in this volume.
 54. Openness and transparency are highlighted in section 13 of the Norwegian code, section 3.1, 
and the guiding principles for the Swedish code, sections 1 and 4 of the Danish code, the 
preamble and introduction to the Finnish code and section 6 of the Icelandic code.
 55. Statutory norms relate to both financial reporting, and informal norms such as publishing 
the names and CVs of board members and management on the company’s web pages.
 56. Section 13 of the Norwegian code.
 57. Ibid.
 58. See section 1.2 and footnote 9 in this article.
 59. Participatory rights are at the core of good governance in some governance settings. See 
Margherita Paola Poto, “Participatory Engagement and the Empowerment of the Arctic 
Indigenous Peoples,” Environmental Law Review 19, no. 1 (2017).
 60. Effectiveness in the sense that it may take less time for one or some persons to agree upon 
something than for more or all to agree, such as, for example, all members of the board of 
directors. Informal norms may, however, facilitate seeking consensus as regards the board of 
directors.
 61. Hansen.
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